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We are in receipt of a letter from ir. Burton A. Konkle,
Secretary of the James Wilson Memorial Committee, announcing that the January issue of the REGISTER has become
the only official account of the Wilson Memorial Ceremonies,
the Committee having decided to issue no memorial volume.
Mr. Konkle asks us to publish this fact, as corrective of his
prediction in his report that such a volume would be issued,
and he also desires us to say that the text of the addresses, as
printed in the REGISTER, is the only published text which has
been corrected by the speakers themselves and approved by
the Secretary.
Copies of the issue may be obtained by addressing the
Business Manager.
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CIVIL LIABILITY OF BANK DIRECTORS.-" The directors of a

bank or other corporation, are, and always were, personally
liable at common law for (I)unauthorized acts, as well as for
a failure to exercise proper care and diligence in the discharge
of their office, when such acts of (2) misfeasance or (3)nonfeasance are productive of damage to the corporation." ' This
liability has not been superceded by a statutory one. The
performance of an act prohibited by Statute may subject the
corporation to a forfeiture of its charter, and the directors to
a criminal action, but this would not render them civilly
liable. The statutes merely restrict and define the powers
delegated.- It is still a common law liability. It arises out
of the contractual relation of principal and agent, and therefore there is a liability for all losses resulting from (x) ultra
vires acts, (2) frauds, and (3) negligence. Since the duty
assumed is entirely gratuitous, it is governed by the common
law doctrine applying to mandatariesO A refusal to execute
the agreement incurs no liability, because of the absence of
consideration, but if entered upon, it must be carried out in
conformity to the terms of the request.
The scope of the director's authority is defined by the
common-law, the charter and by-laws of the bank, and the
statutes of the U. S. Ignorance is no defense,4 but an ultra
vires act is excusable, if it were due to a bona fide mistake
of (r) law or (2) fact, i.e., as to the legal bxtent of the authority,
or as to the circumstances in regard to which he was exercising
it, even though it was due to incompetence. "However
..
it
ridiculous and absurd their conduct might seem .....
is the misfortune of the company, that they chose such unwise
-directors."5
Although frequently called trustees, directors are not such
in the technical sense of the word. They are not parties or
privies to any express declaration of trust or agreement with
the stockholders. But they do stand unquestionably in a
fiduciary relation to, the stockholders, and accordingly in
defining what constitutes an act of misfeasance on the part
of the directors, the rigid rule governing the affirmative acts
of trustees is applied. What would be fraudulent, on the
part of a trustee, is considered so, on the part of a director.
The integrity of his intentions is not material. "Like a
trustee he is absolutely prohibited from the performance of
those questionable acts wherein his conduct may be wholly
CockriU v. Cooper, 86 Fed., 7 (z898).
*Briggs v. Spauldng, 141 U. S., 132 (189x).

sSpeing's A p., 71 Pa., 11 (1872).

4(,oai0r V.VS-, 9 4 Fed., S82 (r899).
Contra Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y.,
sSpcring's App., 7r Pa., xr (872).

6S (188o).
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free from blame, but where the bias of self-interest is strong, and
may influence him without his own recognition of the fact.' 4
Three factors enter into the question as to how much
abstention is required to make directors liable for nonfeasance.
By the (i) statutes of the U. S. a director is allowed to delegate
all the immediate management of the bank, together with all
the discretionary power appertaining. Only in case of a loss
resulting from an attempt to delegate the duty of "general
supervision and control" is there any liability.i The agents
appointed, to whom the above duties are delegated, become
the agents of the bank. The directors are not insurers of their
fidelity, and if the directors are liable for their acts, it is not
on the ground of agency, but because of a neglect of the above
duty of general supervision and control? Because of the (2)
voluntary nature of the duty assumed, the utmost degree of
care is not required. A mandatary need exercise only ordinary
care and diligence, and is orly liable for crassa negligentiagross negligence.s And lastly (3) the courts are under a
"perplexing restraint lest they should by severity of their
rulings, make directorships repulsive to the class of men whose
services are most needed, or by laxity in dealing with glaring
negligence, render worthless the supervision of directors over
national banks, and leave these institutions a prey to dishonest
executive officers."9
Accordingly it has been ruled, 2 that when the directors
have delegated all their powers, except those of general supervision and control; and an attempt is made to hold them
liable for the acts of the appointed officers, the neglect which
would render them liable must depend upon all the circumstances. "If nothing has come to their knowledge, to awake
suspicion of the fidelity of the president and cashier, ordinary
attention to the affairs of the institution is sufficient." 2 Whenever ordinary attention is sufficient to acquaint them with
suspicious facts, they must act. But there is no duty to
cause an examination of the books of the bank, as long as
there is no suspicion, although it would have taken but little
time, and would have shown the true state of affairs.2 The
practical result of this, is to exempt the directors from all
liability except in case of gross and supine negligence. Upon
the authority of this case, it has been held that directors were
not liable, when the exercise of ordinary care and diligence
did not discover, that the examining committee were not doing
their duty, but were relying upon the statements prepared by
6Munson v. Syracuse, 103 N. Y., 58 (1886).
?Warner v. Penoyer, 9 r Fed., 587 (r898).
CharitableCorporationv. Suton. 2 Atk., 400
*Robinson v. Hal, 63 Fed., 222 (1894).
24

(1742).
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the cashier, because there was no affirmative duty on their
part to cause an examination of the books to be made.7 In
the same case it was held, that non-attending directors were
not liable, because the loss was not due to their neglect, since
those who did attend, did not know.7 In view of the above,
the case of Rankin v. Cooper, 149 Fed., ioio (19o7) seems to
be inaccurate, when, in summing up the duties of the directors,
it states "that a part of their duty of general supervision, is
to cause an examination of the conditions and resources of
the bank to be made with reasonable frequency."
DYING DECLARTIONS.-The long accepted rule that a
dying declaration receives a sanction equivalent to that conferred by an oath because of the positive expectation by the
declarant that his death is imminent, and the consequent
presumption that he will speak only the truth, is one from
which the courts have been slow to depart. In England the
adherence to it is absolute: not only will a statement made
by one who has been informed that recovery is barely within
the range of possibility, be excluded,' but the courts maintain
that the knowledge of approaching dissolution must be
affirmatively shown? This doctrine, long regarded as the
only safe limitation of an exception to *arule against hearsay
which many judges have considered of doubtful propriety,
has been followed without alteration in many American juris-4
dictions. Accordingly a Massachusetts and a New Jersey
case have held, that where a decedent was told that his only
hope of recovery lay in an operation, and that such hope was
exceedingly slight, the declarations made thereafter were
inadmissible, since the court was not convinced that the
declarant had abandoned all expectation of surviving.
The American courts do not, however, generally require
an affirmative statement from the declarant that he has given
up all hope of getting well, provided the circumstances are
such as to raise a strong presumption that such is his mental
attitude.5 This presumption may be strengthened by significant acts on his part, such as a willingness to receive the
last sacraments of the Catholic Church, or the hasty execution of a will.7 In this latter case the presumption was held
not to be rebutted by the fact that the testator asked whether
the will would be of any effect in case he recovered, nor did
z Rex v. Christie, 0. B., 182.
a Queen v. Dalmas, I Cox C. C., 9S (1844).
v. Roberts, zog Mass., 3o2 (871).
so N. J. L., 179 (1888).
sKilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa., x98 (z858).
6Car er v. U. S. z64 U. S., 694 (x896).
v AUison v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa., 17 (z884).
sCOr.

4 Peak v. State,
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a similar restriction placed by a declarant upon her statement
-that in case she got well she did not want it publishedoperate to defeat its admissibility.2
Thus the tendency seems to be to consider rather the natural
state of mind resulting from an overwhelming force of circumstances, than to require a total exclusion of all suggestions
holding out any hope of recovery. The distinct departure
from the old hard and fast rule was made by a Georgia case
in 1887,; in which the court admitted the declaration despite
the fact that a physician told the declarant that there was
"one chance in a hundred" for his recovery. This freer, and,
it is submitted, more common sense doctrine has been adopted
by the Supreme Court of Oregon in the recent case of State
v. Thompson-88 Pac. Rep., 583 (1907).

The facts show a

warning to the deceased by his physician that his only chance
lay in an operation, and that he would probably never come
out from under the influence of the anesthetic. Deceased
then made the statement and died fifteen or twenty minutes
afterwards, while the anaesthetic was being administered.
The court held that, under all the circumstances, considering
the nature of the wound and the grave character of the surgeon's warning, the mere fact that deceased was willing to
take the only chance held out to him for his recovery did not
invalidate his declaration.
THE XI AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS TO ENJOIN STATE OFFICERS FROM ENFORCING IN STATE
COURTS A STATE LAW REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE

UNITED STATES.-Amendment XI.
"The Judidial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
No difference of opinion or doubt seems ever to have existed
that a State officer is amenable to suit if he takes possession
of the property of an individual by virtue of an unconstitutional law. In such cases a suit against the officer is not a
violation of the Eleventh Amendment. Tindal v. Wesly,
167 U. S. 204, 212 (1897): Scott v. Donald x65 U. S. 58, 68
(1897): In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, (1893).
Where, however, the wrong has not been consummated

by a physical taking of property, but is merely a threatened
violation of the rights of property -the Federal Supreme
Court has by no means adhered consistently to any one test
of the meaning of the Amendment.
'Peoples v. Commotwealth, 87 Ky., 487 (x888).
Wat" v. State, 79 Ga., 446 (x887).
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Does the XI Amendment prohibit only those suits where
the State is made, by name, a party defendant to the suit?
Such was the interpretative test advanced by Chief Justice
Marshall in 1824, who remarked,
-the i xth Amendment which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the
Constitution over suits against States, is, of necessity, limited to those
suits in which a State is a party to the record."

Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. at p. 857 (1824). In that case
the fact that the Bank of the United States-an agency of the
National Government-was threatened with paralysis in
the State of Ohio by an enactment of that State was plainly
not the least persuasive argument in forming Marshall's
theory of interpretation. (See pp. 847-8).
This test based upon the mere record, having enjoyed
Judicial popularity for some years, became (as late as 1872,
in Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall 220.) finally utterly discarded
though adhered to still in a dissentient opinion by Mr. Justice
Bradley in In re Ayers 123 U. S. 443 (1887) and the Court
has repeatedly regarded the Amendment as having been
violated where the State, though not a party by name on
the record, is in reality a party in interest.
Though the Supreme Court has recognized in later years
that a State though not in name a party to the record may
yet be so affected by the result of the suit against its officers
as to be in reality a party, the Court has expressly and consistently held that in a suit against the Railroad Commissioners
of a State brought by a carrier or its stockholder to enjoin
the enforcement of a confiscatory schedule of rates the State
is not in reality a party to the suit. The decision and the
language of Mr. Justice Brewer in rendering the opinion in
Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 154 U. S. at page 390
(1894) is diredtly in point here:
"So far from the State being the only real party in interest, and
upon whom alone the judgment effectively operates, it has in a pecumary sense no interest at all. Going back of all matters of form,
the only parties pecuniarily affected are the shippers and the carriers.
..
..
Not a dollar will be taken from the treasury of the State,
no pecuniary obligation of it will be enforced, none of its property
affected by any decree which nmay be rendered. It is not nearly so
much affected by the decree in this case as it would be by an injunction against officers staying the collection of taxes, and yet a frequent and unquestioned exercise of jurisdiction of courts, state and
Federal, is in restraining the collection of taxes, illegal in whole or

in part."

Has the same lack of interest been held to exist where the
State is entitled to a penalty? An affirmative answer is
given by such cases as Smyth v. Ames, x96 U. S. 466.

NOTES.
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What is the true position of The Repudiation Cases at
the present day? Inasmuch as the cases against Railroad
Commissioners of a state have been repeatedly and uniformly
decided in favor of the jurisdiction down to the present day
no argument whatever can be drawn from such cases as
In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 491 (1887) and other cases known
as the Repudiation cases in denial of the proposition, that
a suit against Railroad Commissioners to enjoin them from
putting into force an unconstitutional schedule of rates is
not a suit against the State in violation of the XI Amendment.
We have only to compare the grounds upon which the
Repudiation cases were decided to see that the reasoning has
been rendered obsolete Jy the later opinions of the Supreme
Court.
The refusal of the Supreme Court to enjoin state officials
from bringing actions designed to obstruct the bondholders
of the state was declared in the Ayers case to be the inability
of the Federal Judiciary under the Constitution to compel
a state to specifically perform its contracts. Such, it was said
would be the practical effect of such an injunction as was
sought in the Ayers case. . "A bill," said Mr. Justice
Matthews, (in delivering the opinion in the Ayers case at p.
502-3),
"the object of which is by injunction indirectly to compel the spe-

cific performance of the contract by forbidding all those acts and
doings which constitute breaches of the contract must also necessarily be a suit against the State. In such a case, though the State
be not nominally a party on the record, if the defendants are its
officers and agents, through whom alone it can act in doing and refusing to do the things which constitute a breach of contract, the suit
is still, in substance, though not in form, a suit against the State."

The Ayers case was also decided upon the further ground
(pp. 501-502) that there was no individual liability of the

officer sought to be enjoined and that in the prior cases injunctions had been granted against state officers only in those
cases where the officer had been individually liable.
Four years after the decision of In re Ayers a case arose
in 189i which presented the same question, which is indistinguishable upon its facts from the Ayers case but which
did not involve the question of state repudiation of bonds.
In Pennoyerv. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (189i) the Supreme
Court held that an injunction should be granted against a
Governor, Secretary of State and Treasurer of State, comprising the board of Land Commissioners of a state to enjoin
them from selling and conveying land under a statute of the
state which was in violation of the complainant's prior contract with the state.
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Mr. Justice Lamar realizing the necessity of explaining in
x891 why these state officials of Oregon could be enjoined from
reselling land which had already been contracted for by the
complainant, although the Attorney-General of Virginia in
I887 had been held exempt from injunction on the ground
that the suit was an indirect attempt to make the state of
Virginia perform its contracts, adopted the theory of "specific
performance" as a test and line of classification and made
an effort to distribute the cases according to this theory of
interpreting the XI Amendment. But the weakness and
inadequacy of the opinion as a reconciliation of precedents
is apparent when we look for an explanation why this Oregon
case was not in effect a suit to compel the state to perform its
contracts. In neither this nor the Ayers case was the suit
a technical one for specific performance. Why was -the
ultimate effect upon the State of Oregon by enjoining its
officers from selling Pennoyer's land in violation of his contract with the state any less a decree compelling the state to
perform its contract with him than a decree against the
Attorney-General of Virginia would have been a decree
compelling the State of Virginia to perform its contract if
Ayers had been enjoined from assisting the state to repudiate
its debts?
The opinion of Mr. Justice Lamar in the Pennoyer case must
be treated as an effort to do the best that could be done with
the Repudiation case of In re Ayers and to harmonize its
conclusions with the subsequent and prior attitude of the court;
We have only to read the theory of "specific performance"
as a test of interpretation of the XI Amendment in the words
that Mr. Justice Lamar has used on p. ioof the Pennoyer case
140 U. S. io (1891) to realize how inapplicable such a test is.
We have only to glance at the earlier and later decisions of the
court to see that such a test has never been thought of or
applied. The learned Justice remarks that the XI Amendmerit is not violated
"in a proper case where the remnedy at law is inadequate, for an
injunction to prevent such wrong and injury, or for a mandamus,
in a like case, to enforce upon the defendant the performance of a
plain legal duty purely ministeral"
But is not such injunction or mandamus often tantamount to

compelling the state to perform its contract?
The very cases which Mr. Justice Lamar attempts to classify
negative the theory of classification employed. Is not an
injunction forbidding the reissue by a state officer- of land
patented to the complainant as in Davis v. Gray, r6 Wail.
p. 21S tantamount to compelling specific performance of its
contract by a state?
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Again, what is the true nature and effect of granting an
injunction against a state auditor from collecting a state tax
where a railroad by its charter has been exempted from such
taxation? Was not the decree to this effect in Tomlison v.
Branch, i5 Wall. 46o (1872).
The celebrated case, Smyth v. Atis, £69 U. S. 466, otherwise known as "The Nebraska Maximum Rate Case" was
decided in 1898.
The Nebraska rate statute which was ultimately declared
to be unconstitutional as depriving the complainants of their
property was passed April 12, 1893. The suits in question
were brought July 28, 1893.
The eighth section of the statute gave an action for damages
to any person injured by the carrier's violation of the act.
The ninth section of the act prescribed penalties as follows:
"Sec. 9. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do or cause to be done or permit to be done
any act matter or thing in the act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing in this act required
to be done, such common carrier shall upon conviction thereof be
fined in any sum &c.

The Attorney-General of Nebraska was a defendant to the
bill, and the injunction was also directed against him;
and . . and that the Board of Transportation of said state

and the members and secretaries of said Board be in like manner
perpetually enjoined and restrained from entertaining, hearing or
determining any complaint to it against said railroad companies, or
any or either of them . . . for or on account of any act or thing
by either of said companies . . . done or suffered or omitted4
which may be forbidden or commanded by said act, and particularly from reducing its present, rates of charges for transportation
of freight to those prescribed in said act, and that the AttorneyGeneral of this state be in like manner enjoined from bringing, aiding
in bringing or causing to be brought, any proceeding by way of injunction, mandamus, civil action or indictment against said companies
or either of them or their receivers for or on account of any action
or omission on their part commanded or forbidden by the said act.

The Attorney-General was a member of the state Transportation Commission.
The act of April 12, 1893, otherwise known as "House
Roll 33," fixed the maximum schedules of charges and in
sections 8 and 9 as above stated prescribed the remedy and
the penalties.
This act contains no provision for its enforcement other
than as mentioned above, and in the preceding general law.
The petitioning stockholders represented three roads: The
Union Pacific, The Chicago ' Northwestern and the Chicago
Burlington ' Quincy.
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In the case of Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. $z6 (x899) the
facts may be thus summarized:
x. The state of Alabama by statute had prescribed a
confiscatory rate of toll to be charged by the plaintiff on the
Florence Bridge.
2. The penalty for a violation of the act was twenty dollars
to be forfeited to any person as to whom the act fixing the
rate was violated.
3. The suit was brought against the Attorney-General of
Alabama, Fitts, and the solicitor of one of the Judicial Circuits
of the State to enjoin them from proceeding under any indictment or by any criminal proceeding for violating the provisions of the act.
4. The At-torney-General and the Solicitor were not specifically authorized by the act to enforce it.
The Supreme Court held that the XI Amendment prohibited
the suit.
Mr. Justice Harlan who delivered the opinion in Smyth v.
Ames also delivered the opinion in Fitts v. McGhee.
The points of similarity and contrast between the two cases
should be noted.
x. In both cases the confiscatory rate was established by
the direct action of the legislature.
2. In Fitts v. McGhee the penalty was to be paid to any
person in respect of whom the act was violated.
In Smyth v. Ames there was no provision as to whom the
penalty should be paid, but presumably to the state.
3. The suits in both cases were brought against the AttorneyGenerals of the state.
4. In Smyth v. Ames the Attorney-General was a member
of the state board of transportation. To what extent that
fact is significant has been previously shown in stating the
facts of Smyth v. Ames.
In Fitts v. McGhee the Attorney-General was the member
of no commission and the act declared or admitted to be
unconstitutional did not impose upon him the duty expressly
to enforce it.
The foregoing differences were seized upon by the court in
the decision holding that the injunction could not be granted
in the Fitts case, as the suit was said to be in reality one against
the state.
Mr. Justice Harlan in the first part of his opinion used the
Ayers case as the deus ex machina, saying,
"if these principles be applied in the present case there is no escape
from the conclusion that .

one against the state."

.

. this suit against its officers is really

(p. 528-9).
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The opinion further proceeds upon the supposed distinction
between a suit against the officer who has wrongfully obtained
possession of property under color of an unconstitutional
statute and a suit against an officer who is about to obstruct
the enforcement of rights respecting property or openly to
disregard and violate those rights. (see p. 529.)
The distinction based upon a tortious taking of property
appears to have originated in the Ayers case but the test of a
personal liability of the officer as essential to the right to
enjoin him would not be consistent with the decision of
Smyt v. Ames.
The attempt of Mr. Justice Harlan to distinguish between
the Fitts case and the Smyth case is difficult to follow.
The attempt to distinguish between the cases on the ground
that in the Fitts case there was no express authority given to
the Attorney-General to enforce the penalty, whereas Mr.
Justice Harlan states the contrary to be the fact in Smyth v.
Ames, is not satisfactory.
It is noteworthy that in In re Ayers the Attorney-General
was expressly authorized by the unconstitutional statute to
carry it into execution. But Mr. Justice Harlan thinks that
the empowering of the officer of the state in addition to his
general authority to enforce the criminal law is a fact of deep
significance.
He therefore observes in Fitts v. McGhee (p. 529) that:
bIt is to be observed that neither the Attorney-General of Al&bama nor the Solicitor of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of that State

appear to have been charged by law with any special duty in connection with the act . . In support of the contention that the

present suit is not one against the state reference was made by

counsel to several cases

. . . Smyth v Ames . . Upon examination it will be found that the defendants in each of those cases
were officers of the State, specially charged with the execution of a

state enactment alleged to be unconstitutional but under the authority

of which it was averred they were committing or were about to commit
some secific wrong or trespass to the injury of the plaintiff's rights."

(P-529).

Undoubtedly the controlling reason operating in the mind
of Mr. Justice Harlan was the fear that the granting of an
injunction in Fitts v. McGhee would invite infinite litigation
for testing the constitutionality of all State statutes. His
fear on this subject is thus expressed:
"If because they were law officers of the State a case could be
made for the purpose of testing the Constitutionality of the Statute
by means of an injunction suit brought against them, then the Constitutionality of every act passed by the legislature could be tested
by a suit against the Governor and the Attorney-General based upon
the theory that the former as the Executive of the State was, in' a

NOTES.
general sense charged with the Execution of all its laws, and the latter
as Attorney-General, might represent the State in litigation involving
the enforcement of its Statutes."

But to this alarm which was entertained by Mr. Justice
Harlan there would seem to be a prompt answer and one
thoroughly satisfactory to be found in the Limitations which
would necessarily restrict all injunction suits against the
Attorney-General of a State to those in which there is an allegation of either expected orsctual depredation of property if a
statute which that officer has power to enforce be actually
put into effect. Nothing shows more clearly the unsatisfactory and untenable nature of Mr. Justice Harlan's own distinction than the
ambigipus words in which -he has himself expressed it:
"Upon exrminato= it -will be found that the defendants in each

of those cases were" officers of the State, specially charged with the
execution of a state enactment alleged to be unconstitutional. but
under the authority of which, it was averred, they were committing
or were about to commit some specific wrong or trespass to the injury
of the plaintiff's rights. There is a wide difference between a suit
against individuals, holding positions under a State, to prevent them,
under the sanction of an unconstitutional statute from committing
by some'positive act a wrong or trespass, and a suit against officers
of a State merely to test the constitutionality of a state statute, in
the enforcement-of which those officers will act only by formal judicial proceedings in the courts of the State. In the present case, as
we have said, neither of the state officers named held any special
relation to the particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional.

They were not expressly directed to see to its enforcement."

In the Ayers' case, which Mr. Justice Harlan does not
attempt to reconcile with the test which he advances to
distinguish Smyth v. Ames from Fitts v. McGhee, AttorneyG!eneral Ayers had been expressly authorized by the Statute
of Virginia to bring the very suit which the Court held he
could not be enjoined from bringing. Yet in Fitts v. McGhee
Mr. Justice Harlan seized upon the fact that Attorney-General
Fitts of Alabama was not specifically directed to enforce the
confiscatory rate in relation to the Florence Bridge as a valid
distinguishing fact to enable the Court to escape from granting
an injunction which was logically and inexorably demanded
if the principle of Smyth v. Ames should be enforced.
We fail to see why from the standpoint of reason and justice
the answer to the question, when is a suit against an AttorneyGeneral of a State a suit against the State itself, should vary
accordingly as, (a) he is expressly empowered by an unconstitutional act to put that act into force, or, (b) he is not authorized by the act itself but has a general authrity from the
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State to put all its statutes into force which belong to the same
class as the unconstitutional statute in question.
A prori we might fairly suppose on theoretical grounds
that the State itself was rather a party in interest where the
statute expressly provided for its enforcement by the Attorney
General. At all events, the distinction invented by Mr.
Justice Harlan does not commend itself to reason and as a
working theory is wholly inadequate to explain and reconcile
the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Of much significance upon the question of the judicial
interpretation of the eleventh -amendment is the language of
Mr. Justice Shiras in the case of Prout v. Starr, x88 U. S.
page 544 (1903). The suit was brought for an injunction
against one of the Attorney-Generals of Nebraska, Prout,
who after-the decision in Smth v. Ames had succeeded to the
office of Attorney-General, and therefore, undertook to carry
on certain suits for penalfies amounting to $3o,ooo.oo0,
instituted by Smyth when Attorney-General. The injunction
was sustained by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Shiras saying
that
"as the substantial merits of the case are concerned: we are not
called upon to consider them. They have been concluded by the
reasoning and opinion of this Court in the other cases. Sm dh v.
Ames, x69 U. S. page 456."

The significant language is the following:
"It would be indeed most unfortunate if the immunity of the
individual States from suits by citizens of other States, provided
for in the Eleventh Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which conferred powers on Congress to
regulate commerce among the several states, which forbid the States
from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, or from
passing any hill of attainder, cx post fadco law or law impairing the
obligation of contracts. . . . all of which provisions existed
before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which still exists,
and which would be nullified and made of no effect, if the judicial
power of the United States could not be invoked to protect citizens
affected by the passage of State Law disregarding these Constitutional limitations. Much less can the Eleventh Amendment be successfully pleaded as an invincible barrier to judicial enquiry whether
the salutary provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have been
disregarded by State enactments .....
...
It is further argued
by the appellant, as one of the grounds of his demurrer, that he was
complained against in his official capacity as Attorney-General of the
State of Nebraska, and not in his individual capacity as a citizen
thereof, and that the Attorney-General of a State cannot be restrained by an injunction of a United States court from enforcing
the criminal laws of the State.
"This, we think, is only another phase of the same question. It is
true that the defendant was included in the bill as the Attoney-General of the State, but that was because he was one of the board of
transportation, which was directed to enforce the provisions of the
act. The bill did not seek to interfere with the acts of the Attorney-
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General in prosecuting offenders against the valid criminal laws
of the State, but its object was to prevent him from collecting penalties that had accrued under the provisions of a statute judicially
determined to be void. The injunction must be so read and under-

stood."

DUTY OF CARRIERS TO PASSENGERS.-A common carrier
is under a duty to its passengers both those in transit and
those who are upon its premises for the purpose of taking
passage, to take care to protect them from any danger which
it knows is impending from the conduct either of its agents,
of its other passengers, or of strangers. But since it owes,
not an absolute duty of protection from -harm, but only a
duty to -take reasonable precautions for their safety,. knowledge of the existence of danger, actual or probable, is necessary :before it is bound to take action to avert it. It is not
bound therefore to employ sufficient servants to protect its
passengers from mob violence where there is no reason to
anticipate its occurance. P. F. W. ' C. R. R. Co. v. Heines,
.53 Pennsylvania, 513. But in Kuhken v. Boston B. & N.
Street Railway, 79 N. E., 8x S , the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts decided that where the crowding of the
platforms and cars of a carrier at certain hours of the day
was unavoidable in carrying on its business, the questions
whether the carrier was bound to employ an increased number
of men to prevent such crowd as involved danger to passengers, and whether it was reasonable to require such precaution, were for the jury. This being a dangerous condition
due to the habitual behavior of the carrier's patrons and
therefore (one that may be expected to recur constantly),
And the case while
the action of the Court appears correct
close to the line appears clearly distinguishable from those
cases. which hold a carrier under no duty to protect its passengers from merely casual acts of discourtesy or bad manners.?
So too the agents of the carrier in charge of its business are
bound to protect, so far as lies in their power, the passenger
from peril, due to the acts of their fellow passengers, of other
agents of the Company, or of strangers, when they know of
the actual or probable existence of danger from such a source.
R. R. v. Heines, S3 Pa., Sx3. But the carrier is not liable
unless its agent knew of the threatened danger and-took no
precaution, after such notice, to avert the injury. So in
Putnam v. R. R. Co. SS N. Y. App., xo8, it was properly
held that the Company was. not liable for the death of a
passenger caused by an assault suddenly committed upon.

,Mulh.au v.R. R. 2oz Pa., 237.
Eillier v. P. W. & B. R. R. 53 Pa. 2z 3 . Frstz v.Southern R.
R., 132 N. C., 29. Maddin v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 9o N. Y. Supp.,
260.

NOTES.

38t

him b,' a drunken passenger, whose condition did not require
his ej, ction, without any warning of his intention. It has
been generally held throughout the United States that the
carrier owes to its passengers a duty of protection against the
misconduct of its own servants,3 and this is so even though
the servant's act is wilful and done for a purpose of his own
and does not tend to the furtherance of the carrier's business, Chicago R. R. Co. v. Fleckman, 103, Ill., 543, where a
brakesman struck a passenger when accused of having stolen
his watch; and Croker v. R. R. 36 Wis., 657, where a conductor took personal liberties with a female passenger. This
rule is criticised in "Bevan on Negligence," 2nd Edition,
vol. i, p. 707. "This," he says, "is .bsolutely irreconcilable
with the English cases, wheie the obligation is not to insure
the -fitness of servants morally but to, use all reasonable precautions- to obtain a: servant in all respects suitable." In
M. K. &? T. R.*R., v. Raney, 9 9 S. W. Texas, S89, the Court
of Civil Appeals holds that-where the Railway ticket-agent
knowing he had small-pox, exposed himself to contact with
and infected a passenger, the Railroad is liable to the passenger's husband who -contracted the disease from. him.
While it may be doubtful whether the act of the agent can
be properly considered the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
illness, knowledge on the part of the agent of his condition,
was of course essential to recovery. Had the agent himself
been ignorant of his condition he would have been under
no duty to refrain from coming in contact with passengers.
On the other hand, if the Amnerican view of a cairier's duty to
its passengers be accepted, notice to the Company of this
agent's condition would appear unnecessary. For, if the
agent knew he was infected, his act in exposing the passengers to peril by contact with him was a wrong from which
the carrier owed the passenger a duty of protection. The
case of Long v. C. K. & W. R. R., 28 Pacific Reports, 977,
where on identical facts the Supreme Court of Kansas refused
to hold the Railroad liable because it did not appear that
any of the agent's superiors knew of his condition, can only
be supported on the English doctrine that the carrier's liability
is to use only reasonable precautions to obtain servants in
all respects suitable. Had an agent of a Company admitted
into contact with the passengers a person kfiown by him to
be infected with small-pox, there can be no doubt that the
Company would have been liable. This decision appears
directly contrary to the American rule that the Company
is liable where the agent himself does an injurious act which
it is his duty to prevent others from doing.
sS. S. Co. v. Brockat,

121 U. S., 637.

